Strategic Reflections on the Protection of China's Overseas Interests

Overseas interests "are the overseas extension of national interests. Generally speaking, national overseas interests are mainly divided into four categories: overseas security interests, political interests, economic interests, and cultural interests. Since the "the Belt and Road" initiative was put forward, the depth and breadth of China's access to the outside world have undergone unprecedented changes, and China's national interests extending overseas have expanded dramatically. The protection of China's overseas interests is increasingly manifested in how to better safeguard the personal and property safety of overseas citizens and expatriates, the safety of Chinese facilities and projects abroad, ensuring access to international markets and resources for Chinese enterprises, ensuring the safety of energy security and strategic resource transportation channels, and promoting the recognition and dissemination of China's national image. However, the construction and development of the ability to protect overseas interests is not an overnight task. As a latecomer to globalization, China's rapid growth and expansion of overseas interests is objectively contradictory to its limited ability to protect overseas interests.

The External International Environment Faced by China's Overseas Interest Protection

The protection of overseas interests is a key focus of national security capacity building in the new era. As a latecomer to globalization, China's rapidly growing and expanding overseas interests objectively contradict its limited ability to protect them in reality.

Faced with the world system dominated by the United States and the West, which is full of vigilance towards us, China needs to have a clear strategic consciousness to build an overseas interest protection system.

Today, the global financial, technological, supply chain, public security, cultural media, and ideological discourse are all controlled by a few developed countries, mainly the United States and the West. China does not have the ability to completely break or remain outside of this system in the short term. A clear understanding of this strategic reality is a prerequisite for China to formulate foreign strategies and carry out overseas interest protection. For the world system led by the United States, which is full of vigilance and suppression towards China, on the one hand, we need to have a clear understanding of its unfairness and not hold a lucky mentality. On the other hand, we should also see that the periphery of this system is moving towards disintegration and instability. In this chaotic situation, China's foreign strategic layout needs to determine which are core interests and which are general interests, and adopt cost-effective ways to safeguard its overseas interests as much as possible, rather than attacking from all sides, without strategy, and wasting resources. This is not only a strategic consciousness, but also an inherent requirement for us to effectively carry out overseas interest protection work in the complex international situation.

China's "the Belt and Road" overseas security situation is characterized by many points of interest, long lines, wide coverage, limited security governance capacity and other complex security situations.

Since the the Belt and Road Initiative was put forward 10 years ago, China has cooperated with investors along the Belt and Road in a wide range of fields and projects, among which major projects have made great achievements, but also faced various difficulties and security risks. First of all, many host governments of the "the Belt and Road" project are "weak governments", and their domestic security governance capacity is limited. No matter how China mediates and coordinates, the role that the relevant departments of the host government can play is also greatly limited. Secondly, the large-scale projects and infrastructure constructed in our country are mostly located in or pass through turbulent areas and areas where the "three forces" are active. For example, Pakistani terrorist organizations and rebel armed groups are increasingly active in Balochistan Province (where Gwadar Port is also located) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province along the western route of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and there is a trend of cross provincial activities, posing an increased threat to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor project. Thirdly, intelligence agencies from major countries such as the United States and India are vigorously developing agents in Pakistan, actively supporting separatist organizations such as Balochistan, and interfering with the construction of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor by creating human rights and environmental issues.

Taking the Gwadar Port in the China Pakistan Corridor as an example, the port has completed the construction of port infrastructure and achieved preliminary navigation. However, the social public opinion and security environment around the Gwadar project have continued to deteriorate in recent years. The population of Gwadar city is about 100000, but there have been multiple protests and demonstrations by fishermen with a population of over 10000. The local ethnic separatist armed forces in Balochistan, the Baloch Liberation Army, have launched multiple attacks against Chinese project personnel in the vicinity of the Gwadar Port project, including neighboring provinces. In recent years, they have even carried out suicide bombings targeting Chinese personnel, including Confucius Institute teachers, using highly educated "women's bombs". Although the port facilities of Gwadar Port have already been completed and navigable, the surrounding environment of Gwadar Port continues to deteriorate and the safety risks are high. If this situation continues, it will be difficult for the port to play its expected strategic pivot role, and it may become an "isolated port".

Taking the Kyaukpyu project in Myanmar as an example, although it has not yet fully started construction, the difficulties and risks it faces have become prominent, which can be summarized as "triple threat, four types of risks".

The 'triple threat' mainly includes:

Complex geopolitical environment: the conflict between the central government of Myanmar (controlled by the military) and the local Rakhine nationalist political forces in Rakhine State; The central government of Myanmar hopes for reunification, but Rakhine State has a tendency towards autonomy or even independence. There is both armed conflict between the Arakan army and the Burmese army, as well as support from the Northern Alliance for the Arakan army; Moreover, major countries such as the United States, Japan, and India are all intervening in Rakhine State, attempting to fish in troubled waters.

Complex ethnic and religious conflicts: In Rakhine State, there are not only conflicts between the Rakhine people who believe in Buddhism and the Rohingya people who believe in Islam, but also conflicts between the Rakhine people and the Burmese people.

A new type of security threat under the combination of American style punches: The United States strategically uses the "Rohingya" and "Rakhine ethnic issues" to create ethnic and religious conflicts, and launches public opinion debates against Chinese companies and projects.

The "four types of risks" specifically include:

1. Political risks within Myanmar.

The Myanmar side believes that investing in and constructing such a large project in Rakhine State, which is far away from the core economic area of Myanmar, has little effect on driving the entire Myanmar economy and is more aimed at meeting China's strategic needs.

The contradiction between the "central" and "local" governments in Myanmar.

The main ethnic group in Myanmar is the Burmese, with the majority of government officials and upper echelons of the military coming from the Burmese. The main ethnic group in Rakhine State, where the Kyaukpyu project is located, is the Rakhine. There has been a long-standing conflict between the Burmese and Rakhine ethnic groups. Therefore, signing an agreement with the government of the Union of Myanmar does not mean that the Kyaukpyu project can be launched without obstacles. In the planning and implementation process, more consideration needs to be given to the demands of stakeholders.

3. The economic sustainability of the project is an inherent risk of the Jiaoyu project.

Firstly, the Jiaoyu project has a huge investment scale and a long construction period. If there is a shortage of local construction raw materials, such as sand and gravel mostly from Mengbang, the transportation cost is often higher than the direct procurement cost of sand and gravel. The investment in project funds is disproportionate to the short-term income output that can be obtained. Secondly, the Kyaukpyu project is located in a remote area, and the transportation infrastructure between Rakhine State and Kyaukpyu is very backward. Without comprehensive upgrading, it is difficult to meet the needs of industrial development above a certain scale. If the transportation around Jiaoyu, including the China Myanmar railway, ports, and industrial zones, is not solved, sustainable operation will be challenged.

4. The long-term layout of Western NGOs and their manipulation of land acquisition and environmental issues may lead to social public opinion and reputation risks.

Over the past decade, numerous international NGO organizations have entered Rakhine State and Kyaukpyu in large numbers, supporting the establishment of many local NGO organizations that focus on various fields including healthcare, environmental protection, human rights, education and training, and community capacity building. There are numerous international and local NGOs participating in the Jiaoyu project, with as many as 107 expressing interest and signing joint letters solely for the Jiaoyu project. In recent years, the Myanmar government has strengthened its control over NGOs in Rakhine State. However, some Western NGOs have already taken root in the area, collecting various negative information about Chinese funded enterprises and projects, and preparing "shells" for public opinion attacks.

China's existing overseas interest protection capability needs to be strengthened

The investment in diplomatic and consular protection needs to be strengthened, and the preventive protection function should be fully utilized

Diplomatic institutions and our embassies abroad are on the front line of safeguarding overseas interests, and there are often the following shortcomings in the overseas interest protection work of Chinese embassies and consulates:

1. Information research lacks depth and specificity, and the research questions are more limited to the upper level political situation and macro situation, with limited understanding of changes in local public opinion and the activities of anti China forces.

2. Often, it tends to focus on the matter at hand and lacks long-term strategic planning in eliminating threats and hidden dangers to overseas interests. The response measures to crisis events that harm our overseas interests are relatively limited.

3. The preventive protection function of diplomatic consuls needs to be fully utilized, but the targeted release of security risk information is limited, and the coverage of national training is insufficient, which has not fully played the role of "prevention and early warning".

China's overseas security forces started late and should adapt to the rapidly growing demand for protecting overseas interests as soon as possible.

China's market-oriented security forces have made great progress since the "the Belt and Road" initiative was proposed, but Chinese security companies still have many weaknesses in overseas security market access, industry standards, professional capabilities, overseas network construction, etc.

The specific manifestation is as follows:

1. Lack of legal identity, qualifications, and legal status.

Taking the China Pakistan Corridor, the flagship project of the "the Belt and Road", as an example, despite the deep friendship between China and Pakistan, the legal registration of Chinese security companies in Pakistan has not been approved (only one company was in Lahore when the China Pakistan Corridor was launched, but it has not continued to operate). Overseas security is a highly sensitive field, and obtaining market access and compliant operation is still an obvious obstacle for most Chinese security agencies. Taking the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea as an example, Nigerian laws do not allow foreigners to carry out security business in their country. The Maritime Safety Administration regards escorting foreign merchant ships as a profitable cake and imposes various restrictions on the entry of foreign security companies. But for Nigeria's former suzerain country, this is not the case. The core team members of British security companies often have dual citizenship of the UK and Nigeria, and have advantages that Chinese security companies find difficult to compare in policy formulation, access qualifications, and political and business networks related to the security field.

2. Insufficient security intelligence monitoring capability.

Taking the maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea as an example, let's take the famous AMBREY maritime security company in the UK as an example. This company not only has its own large patrol boats in the local waters, but also has rich connections in the political, business, military, and police sectors of various countries along the Gulf of Guinea coast. It has also received investment support from American big data intelligence companies - it has strong real-time monitoring capabilities for maritime intelligence in global waters and the Gulf of Guinea region, so it can often detect early warning crises and deploy security forces more scientifically. Compared to this, Chinese security companies are still in the early stages of development, lacking both technological big data intelligence empowerment and a human intelligence network familiar with coastal countries,

Daily service activities and customer service can only meet basic information needs by purchasing intelligence analysis reports from Western companies. This will greatly increase the risk of Chinese companies and security agencies being subjected to reverse intelligence analysis, creating new security risks.

3. Disadvantages of market competition.

Overseas security companies invest heavily in personnel recruitment and training, equipment allocation, and daily personnel maintenance in the early stages. Chinese security companies started relatively late and have limited customer numbers, resulting in very limited revenue and profit margins in the early stages. Western security companies not only have overwhelming advantages in the international security market, but also often target and suppress Chinese security companies through low prices. These companies all have offices in Chinese Mainland, and through comprehensive price advantages, they compete with Chinese security companies to seize the small high-end market share of Chinese enterprises. Chinese security companies need to improve their product system, reverse the passive situation of price competition, and the future development prospects are not optimistic.

4. Traditional security bureaus need to establish a "big security protection model" to address new security risks.

Overseas security is not simply a matter of deploying security personnel and installing cameras. Behind it are intelligence information, the application of legal rules, and the shaping of public opinion. It is a combination of security measures and tools in various fields. Most domestic security companies have limited understanding and awareness of security risk management, often limited to physical security and civil defense. They only look at the number of cameras in the project camp, whether there are entrance and exit controls, and need to have a deep understanding of the social and historical geography around the project site to dynamically assess risks. These are based on accurate intelligence capabilities in the project task area. At the same time, on-site security incident handling is often only the last link in security protection. The role of how to communicate with local law enforcement agencies, chiefs, and tribal elders in the early stage and establish community intelligence networks by making friends in grassroots communities is more significant. Strictly speaking, the traditional security and safety measures employed by most domestic security companies are the final hurdle in the security risk management process.

Therefore, whether from the laws of security risk management itself or from the precise attacks by the United States on Chinese technology companies in the process of Sino US game, it indicates that new security threats have become the core threat for Chinese companies to "go global". In the face of new security threats, the role that traditional security companies can play is very limited. To cope with new risks, what is needed is a new type of security risk management capability that can closely integrate information and intelligence collection and analysis, public relations dissemination, public opinion influence, information security, and the application of legal rules.

The construction of overseas interest protection system should adhere to strategic guidance principles

The principle of "putting myself first" and "integrating and intersecting the interests of the host country"

China's overseas interests have multiple distribution points, long lines, and wide coverage, but the ability and system construction for protecting overseas interests cannot be achieved overnight. In today's context, if China cannot effectively protect its overseas interests, it is difficult to imagine China relying solely on its resources and market to compete with the world system controlled by the United States in the long run. Standing at this height, the protection of overseas interests is a global strategic issue that affects the comprehensive rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. We should plan and promote the work of protecting overseas interests with a focus on ourselves. As mentioned earlier, the "the Belt and Road" countries have limited social governance and security management and control capabilities. If we only cooperate with the governments of the two countries, many interests will be difficult to be effectively guaranteed - the other side is unwilling, but it is difficult.

At the same time, the protection of overseas interests is mostly carried out on the territory of other countries, which requires us to attach importance to the integration and intersection with the interests of the host country through international cooperation, so that the protection of overseas interests can be stable and far-reaching.  

The guiding principle of 'prevention before is better than control after'

In the protection and response of overseas interests, prevention is the top priority, and attacking the heart is the top priority. Dealing with problems before they arise is actually the bottom line of security risk management. Therefore, whether from the perspective of the laws of overseas security and interest protection work itself, or from the current situation of China's strategic tradition and the development of overseas interest protection capabilities, China should emphasize "prevention first" and "soft power" first.

Therefore, based on international successful experience and practical experience in dealing with overseas security risks, China's overseas interest protection should adhere to the guiding ideology of "prevention and shaping are more important than hard confrontation", and prioritize the development of "soft power" and "smart power" - using technology such as big data to analyze the overall political, security, public opinion environment and project threat sources of the host country, and achieve political and public opinion risk warning; Conduct in-depth research on the public and social conditions around key projects, guide Chinese NGOs to carry out targeted work on people's livelihoods and sentiments around the projects, and positively influence and shape the social public opinion and security environment around the projects.

Combining national will with market rules to construct a comprehensive overseas interest protection model that integrates judicial law enforcement and market-oriented security service institutions

At present, Chinese enterprises and citizens are still facing a world system dominated by the United States and the West when they go global. China's overseas interest protection force "going out", whether it is the military, security law enforcement force, or social market security force, whether it is entering the developed countries in the United States and the West, or moving towards the "the Belt and Road" and underdeveloped countries, is first faced with the problem of how to truly "go out" and can continue to exist locally, and overseas interest protection needs to integrate resources and capabilities in diplomacy, security, strategic communication and other aspects and form a collaborative support and guarantee system. Therefore, the overseas interest protection system should be organized and constructed by the state, comprehensively designing the overseas interest protection system, clarifying the relevant responsibilities of each department, coordinating the overseas interest protection work of each department, and commanding relevant departments to respond to major emergencies that harm our overseas interests. Therefore, coordinated design led by functional departments of the Chinese government is a prerequisite for effectively carrying out overseas interest protection work. However, considering the differences in different systems, simply providing support and protection to Chinese enterprises and overseas citizens as a government will face vigilance and prevention from the United States, Western countries, and some host countries. Moreover, it is difficult for the government to provide personalized support and protection for enterprises. Therefore, at the overseas implementation level, with the government as the backing, providing support and protection to Chinese enterprises in a market-oriented and private manner should be the basic guiding principle that China should uphold in carrying out overseas interest protection for enterprises in the current context of globalization. From the perspective of power building and allocation, the military is responsible for strategic deterrence, counter-terrorism, and evacuation functions, while the public security department is responsible for daily security protection and cross-border law enforcement cooperation; Socialized commercial security forces are involved in the protection of medium to low intensity security and the daily safety management of enterprise personnel, gradually forming an overseas interest protection model that integrates military forces, judicial law enforcement forces, and civilian market-oriented security service institutions.

Gradually evolving from "understanding integration rules" to "applying construction rules"

The formation of the "world system" dominated by the United States and the West has gone through nearly five hundred years of evolution, and then it was transferred and gradually improved by the United States through two world wars as a complete set of rules and systems. This world system is backed by the US military as a strong security force, based on American technological innovation and the rule of law framework, and catalyzed by the global influence and control of American financial capital and mass media. Moreover, American interests are often "designed" into internationally accepted rules (seemingly public, but leaving many hidden doors for rule makers to freely enter and exit). Although the world system has begun to loosen, there is still no clear alternative in the short term - China has the most potential among major power centers, but in the short term, it does not have enough resources and capabilities to build a global system that can replace the current one centered around the United States and the West. The "the Belt and Road" is a great attempt to build a world system, but there is still a long way to go to play a role in practice. Therefore, critically learning and even integrating into the existing world system where interests overlap may be an unavoidable stage for China's rise, and this process may even last for a longer period of time. American style globalization has indeed encountered a series of profound crises. At this level and significance, the Chinese civilization, which has fully absorbed all the achievements of human civilization and been revitalized, should have great achievements. Developed countries such as the United States and the West are more in the region where "the system is beginning to loosen, but there are still rules". However, as the edge of the existing world system, the "the Belt and Road" countries and Asian, African and Latin American countries are facing the risk of "irregular" or "out of rules" governance failure to a greater extent. From this perspective, China, as a "civilized country" with a complete industrial system, is likely to share and impart the experience of a rising country in how to build an "industrialized society" to achieve effective social governance while providing industrial products and infrastructure projects. This kind of 'mutual exchange of goods and services' is welcomed in third world countries, and it also has inherent historical rationality for these countries to overcome their development difficulties.

This idea is reflected in the protection of overseas interests. While critically learning from the rules of the United States and the West, the "the Belt and Road" countries and Asian, African and Latin American countries should help local governments, enterprises and people to improve and build a more reasonable social governance mechanism through various means. Through "policy communication", "facility connectivity", "unimpeded trade", "people to people" and "information connectivity", we should help these countries achieve economic growth and improve social governance. At the same time, in this process, we will also provide a more friendly "political and commercial security environment" for Chinese enterprises and citizens to "go global". This is a continuous "learning by understanding" (rules), "integration" (rules), and then go to the process of "building" (rules).